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Abstract 
What are the policies and country-level conditions which best explain bilateral 
trade flows between countries? As databases expand, an increasing number of 
possible explanatory variables are proposed that influence bilateral trade 
without a clear indication of which variables are robustly important across 
contexts, time periods, and which are not sensitive to inclusion of other 
control variables. To shed light on this problem, we apply three model 
selection methods – Lasso reguarlized regression, Bayesian Model Averaging, 
and Extreme Bound Analysis -- to candidate variables in a gravity models of 
trade. Using a panel of 198 countries covering the years 1970 to 2000, we find 
model selection methods suggest many fewer variables are robust that those 
suggested by the null hypothesis rejection methodology from ordinary least 
squares.  
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1.  Introduction 
In 1962, Tinbergen proposed that the flow of trade between two countries should be 
proportional to the size of the countries’ economies and inversely proportional to their distance. 
In reference to Newton’s law of universal gravitation, he dubbed this relationship as 
“gravity.”Subsequently, countless empirical studies found gravity to be a robust relationship 
across a broad range of contexts and time periods. The model was so popular that it led Anderson 
(1979) to state that the gravity model was “the most successful empirical trade device of the last 
twenty-five years.” 
This model was placed on firm theoretical ground through the work of Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) and the large literature that followed3  At the same time, there has been a revival 
of interest in empirical ‘gravity’ models that are motivated by policy questions such as “do 
currency unions matter?” or “do trade agreements/customs unions increase trade?” both of which 
remain relevant today. The problem of variable selection for empirical analysis of the gravity 
model is growing more complex as the availability of machine-readable databases expand along 
with statistical and computational methods for handling large datasets.  It is tempting to include 
every possible empirical determinant of trade in the gravity model, although there are well 
known problems with “overfitting.”4 Further, variables that improve fit in-sample may not 
predict well when applied out of sample or to other datasets.  If the empirical gravity model is to 
be used to inform policy it must balance in-sample and out-of-sample performance.  
Our goal in this paper is to evaluate the robustness of commonly included measures of trade 
frictions, policy decisions, and country characteristics in determining the extent of bilateral trade. 
We use a panel of 198 countries from 1970 to 2000, and apply a standard empirical form of the 
gravity equation. To evaluate the robustness of variables included in the gravity equation we use 
three empirical methods:  Bayesian Model Averaging; Lasso; and Extreme Bound Analysis6 for 
the purposes of variable selection. Through these methods we learn which variables should be 
included in the gravity equation, that is which ones robustly predict trade flows.  
                                                 
 
4 Even, curiously, data on Eurovision scores (Felbermayr and Toubal, 2009). 
6 These methods are not entirely new in economics, with Varian (2014), Belloni and Chernozhukov 
(2013) advocating for the use of Lasso, and Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001) employing Bayesian Model 
Averaging in the context of cross-country growth regressions. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the Anderson-van Wincoop 
(2003) model of the gravity equation, which has become the standard workhorse model used in 
empirical implementation, and summarizes relevant empirical research. Section 3 presents 
background on the three empirical methods used for variable selection. Section 4 introduces the 
data used in our analysis and section 5 contains the results of applying the three approaches to 
model selection to bilateral trade data.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology 
Anderson (1979) was the first researcher to present theoretical foundations which rationalized 
the gravity model. His model rested on the assumption that each country produces a single, 
imperfectly substitutable good. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) extended the single-good 
framework of Anderson (1979) to an arbitrary number of goods. We use their model with some 
modifications to the specification of trade costs.  
2.1 Model Description 
The consumer’s objective is: 
(1) max
𝑐𝑖𝑗
{(∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑖
1−𝜎
𝜎 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝜎−1
𝜎 )
𝜎
𝜎−1
}    𝑠. 𝑡.  ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑖𝑗 = 𝑦𝑗𝑖  
where 𝑐𝑖𝑗 is the consumption in region 𝑗 of goods from exporting region 𝑖, 𝑝𝑖𝑗 is the price of 
region 𝑖 goods for region 𝑗 consumers, and 𝑦𝑗 is nominal income in region 𝑗. The parameter 𝛽𝑖 is 
a scale distribution parameter and 𝜎 is the elasticity of substitution between all goods. Trade 
costs enter the model through costs passed from exporter to importer. That is, 𝑡𝑖𝑗  𝑖s the trade cost 
factor between 𝑖 and 𝑗, and given an exporter's supply price of 𝑝𝑖 we can model the importer's 
supply price as 𝑝𝑖𝑗  =  𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗. Next we let 𝑥𝑖𝑗 be the nominal value of exports from 𝑖 to 𝑗. Since 
these exports are eventually consumed in region 𝑗 we must have 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑖𝑗. Finally, since each 
country consumes the value of its income,  𝑦𝑖 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑗 . Maximization of equation (1) yields:  
(2) 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = (
𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗
Ρ𝑗
)
(1−𝜎)
𝑦𝑗   
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where Ρ𝑗 = [∑ (𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗)
1−𝜎
𝑖 ]
1
1−𝜎
 is the consumer price index in region j. In words the 
optimization condition states that exports from region 𝑖 to 𝑗 are related to the exporter's supply 
price and the trade cost factor divided by the destination country’s CPI.  
Imposing market clearing gives us 
(3) 𝑦𝑖 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = ∑ (
𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗
 Ρ𝑗
)
(1−𝜎)
= (𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑖)
1−𝜎 ∑ (
𝑡𝑖𝑗
Ρ𝑗
)
1−𝜎
𝑦𝑖𝑗 ∀ 𝑖 𝑗𝑗𝑗  
 
Let 𝑌𝑊 = ∑ 𝑦𝑗𝑗   denote world income.  Summing over all countries gives the more tractable 
expression: 
(4) 𝑥𝑖𝑗 =
𝑦𝑖𝑦𝑗
𝑌𝑊
(
𝑡𝑖𝑗
ΠiΡ𝑗
)
1−𝜎
   
where 
(5) Π𝑖 = (∑ (
𝑡𝑖𝑗
Ρ𝑗
)
1−𝜎
𝑦𝑗
𝑌𝑊𝑖
)
1
1−𝜎⁄
  
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) propose one normalization that provides a solution to the set 
of equations (4) and (5) which is Π𝑖 = Ρ𝑖. They note however that this is not innocuous
7. 
Nevertheless, with this normalization we arrive at the most widely used form of the gravity 
equation: 
(6) 𝑥𝑖𝑗 =
𝑦𝑖𝑦𝑗
𝑌𝑊
(
𝑡𝑖𝑗
Ρ𝑖Ρ𝑗
)
1−𝜎
  
The “gravity” elements--a negative relationship between trade and distance and a positive 
relationship between trade and GDP--are evident in equation (6). Trade flows between regions 𝑖 
and 𝑗 are positively related to the product of the countries’ GDP. Because 𝑡𝑖𝑗 is almost always 
parameterized to include distance, trade flows are inversely related to the distance between the 
                                                 
7 The general solution is of the form Ρ𝑖 =  𝜆Ρ̅𝑖 and Π𝑖 = Π̅𝑖/𝜆. The normalization is not innocuous in that 
in practice these multilateral resistance terms are estimated via country fixed effects. This is appropriate 
for cross-sectional estimation, but not for panel estimation. For more on panel estimation with the gravity 
model see Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Egger and Nelson (2011). 
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two regions. The elements Ρ𝑖 and Ρ𝑗   are the “multilateral resistance” terms for regions 𝑖 and 𝑗 
respectively. Though they are only indexed by 𝑖 and 𝑗, note that both of them include the sum of 
all other regions’ trade costs.  
2.2 Empirical Specification of the Gravity Model 
The estimating equation for the linear standard gravity equation is derived by taking the natural 
log of equation (6) and adding an error term: 
(7)               ln(𝑇𝑖𝑗) = 𝑘 + ln(𝑦𝑖) + ln(𝑦𝑗) + (1 − 𝜎)𝑡𝑖𝑗 + (1 − 𝜎)Ρ𝑖 + (1 − 𝜎)Ρ𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗  
 
where 𝑘 is a constant term, and 𝑇𝑖𝑗  are the bilateral flows from region 𝑖 to 𝑗 (i’s exports to j plus 
j’s exports to i).  The multilateral resistance terms Ρ𝑖𝑗 can be accounted for using country-level 
fixed effects. The more troubling parameter is 𝑡𝑖𝑗, the trade cost specification, which is not 
observed. In Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) the authors specify the trade cost as a function 
of bilateral distance and whether the trade flows occur between two different countries: 𝑡𝑖𝑗 =
𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑝
.  
 
In the related empirical literature, researchers have specified 𝑡𝑖𝑗  to include (i) measures of 
cultural or ethnic closeness, such as  having a common language or a common legal system; (ii) 
geographic considerations that affect the ease of moving goods, such as sharing a border, being 
landlocked, being an island; (iii) membership in the WTO and/or other regional trading groups; 
(iv) a host of policies that bear on exchange rate stability; the ease of currency convertibility, 
banking and exchange rate crises.    
This is far from an exhaustive list of variables considered in the empirical gravity equation. 
Our goal in this paper is to address the problem of “model uncertainty” through application of 
three methods which are well-suited to this problem. We discuss these methods in the next 
section.  
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3. Statistical Methods 
In this section we give a brief overview of the three methods used in the paper. These methods 
were developed in part to assist with the issue of selecting the optimal statistical model, thus they 
seem particularly well suited to this use.8 Our empirical approach is to estimate equation (7) 
using panel regressions that include exporter, importer and year fixed effects. Note the variable 
selection mechanisms are not applied to the fixed effects which are used uniformly throughout 
the specifications.    
3.1 Extreme Bound Analysis 
Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) was proposed by Leamer (1983, 1985) to address model 
uncertainty. EBA attempts to find which variables, in the set of candidate variables 𝑿, are 
associated with an outcome variable yet robust to the inclusion of different control variables.  As 
summarized by Leamer (2008): 
“Extreme bounds analysis is a global sensitivity analysis that applies to the choice of 
variables in a linear regression. Rather than a discrete search over models that include 
or exclude subsets of the variables, this sensitivity analysis answers the question: how 
extreme can the estimates be if any linear homogenous restrictions on a selected subset of 
the coefficients are allowed?” 
The robustness of each coefficient is determined by whether the coefficient remains statistically 
significant and of the same sign in a reasonable number of estimated models. More formally, let 
𝑭 be the set of control variables that remain fixed in every model specification, which we call the 
“fixed” variables. The set 𝑿 contains the variables that are the focus of the sensitivity analysis, 
which we refer to as the uncertain set of variables. Finally, let 𝑼𝑗 ⊆ X be the subset of variables 
which we use as control variables for a given specification 𝑗. Let x ∈ X be a singular control 
variable that we are focusing on with model 𝑗. The model we use to estimate the robustness of 
𝑥 has the form  
(8) 𝑦 = 𝛽0,𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑥 + 𝛾𝑗𝑭 + Λj𝑼𝑗 + 𝜖  
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where 𝑗 indexes the regression models. We estimate this regression for each of the 𝑀 possible 
models depending on the combinations of 𝑼𝑗 that are possible. The number of elements in 𝑼𝑗 is 
typically limited to three variables in the literature (see Levine and Renelt (1992)) though the 
number of elements to be included for each specification is in theory limited only by the size of 
X. In the present application, this specification is estimated for all subsets of X with the 
exception any subsets including x itself.  This process yields a distribution of coefficient 
estimates and associated standard errors, which are used to estimate empirical confidence 
intervals at some desired level of significance. The “extreme bound” for the coefficient of 
variable x is given by [a,b], where a  is the lowest value in any confidence interval and b  is the 
highest value in any confidence interval. The variable x is robust if [a,b] does not contain the 
value zero. The variable is “fragile” if [a,b] contains zero. 
3.2 Lasso Regression 
The Lasso regression is a member of the family of regularized regressions which estimates a 
regression model with an added constraint that forces parsimony in the coefficient estimate 
(Tibshirani, 1996). These estimators are referred to as “shrinkage” estimators, so named because 
relative to OLS their coefficients are biased towards zero. The motivation for shrinking 
coefficients towards zero comes from the bias-variance tradeoff; by adding more parameters one 
can easily reduce within-sample error or bias. This comes at the expense of a larger estimator 
variance or out-of-sample error. Lasso regressions and other shrinkage estimators attempt to 
strike a balance between in-sample and out-of-sample error.  
Formally, the Lasso estimator, 𝛽𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜 solves the minimization problem  
(9)    𝛽𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜 = argmin
𝛽
{
1
2
∑ (𝑦𝑖 − 𝛽0 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝐾
𝑗=1 𝛽𝑗)
2𝑁
𝑖=1 ⏟                 
𝑂𝐿𝑆 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
+ 𝜆∑ |𝛽𝑗|
𝐾
𝑗=1⏟      
𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
}  
 
where 𝜆 ≥ 0 is a parameter that represents a penalty associated with the sum of the absolute 
values of the coefficients. The Lasso estimator adjusts all parameter estimates by the same 
absolute amount unless this adjustment would cause the parameter to change sign, in which case, 
the parameter is set to zero (Friedman, Hastie, and Tibshirani, 2001). Note that as 𝜆 → 0, the 
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parameter penalization decreases and 𝛽𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜 → 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆. As 𝜆 → ∞,  variables are penalized more 
stringently and 𝛽𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜 converges to the zero vector. 
 Optimal 𝜆∗ is selected through cross-validation and comparing root mean squared error 
(RMSE) from a vector of possible ?̂?.  The cross-validation algorithm for selecting 𝜆∗  is as 
follows: Sample data are split into K equally sized subsamples, or ‘folds,’ of equal size. Model 
estimation is performed using (K-1) of the folds and the resulting estimates are used to forecast 
or fit the data on the withheld fold. The average root mean squared error of this forecast is a 
function of 𝜆. Thus, the ex-post optimal 𝜆∗ is the value of λ that minimizes this RMSE.  In 
practice, however, researchers often choose the value of λ that corresponds to the more 
restrictive model associated with a one-standard-deviation increase in the cross-validation 
RMSE.9 We follow this practice in our analysis.   
 Belloni and Chernozhukov (2013) discuss the Lasso estimator in the context of statistical 
inference. The original Lasso method (Tibshirani, 1996) was developed from the standpoint of 
prediction, which differs from the usual approach of applied economists who are concerned with 
parameter inference. Belloni and Chernozhukov develop an estimator they call the “post-Lasso” 
estimator, which they show to perform at least as well as the Lasso estimator with slightly less 
bias. The post-Lasso estimator is a two-step procedure. In step 1, a Lasso model is estimated 
over a large set of possible control variables. The variables which have non-zero coefficients are 
selected and retained for use in the second step. In step 2, an OLS model is fit using only the 
subset of variables that had non-zero coefficients in the first step. This method leans on the 
strengths of each approach: Lasso is useful for variable selection but presents biased estimates of 
coefficients.10 OLS is unbiased and efficient, though cannot handle models with large number of 
covariates. In our analysis we present both the Lasso and the Post-Lasso estimates.  
                                                 
9 See Krstajic et al (2014) for more discussion on the selection of 𝜆. The value is set to the RMSE 
minimizing value plus one standard error for the purposes of choosing “the simplest model whose 
accuracy is comparable with the best model.” That is, while a more complicated model may perform 
better, the more parsimonious model performs comparable well enough to the more complicated one.  
   
10 Since Lasso estimation may shrink fixed effect coefficients, which should be included in any unbiased 
estimate, we employ a two step procedure. In the first step, we use Frisch-Waugh-Lovell (FWL) theorem 
(Frisch and Waugh, 1933; Lovell, 1963) to transform the dependent and independent variables to control 
for the level fixed effects. In the second step, the desired estimator is used on the FWL- transformed data 
series.  
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3.3 Bayesian Model Averaging 
Bayesian model averaging (BMA) is an intuitive approach to model uncertainty where Bayes 
Rule is applied to the model and data, from which one can construct posterior parameter 
estimates. One advantage of BMA is that as in typical Bayesian estimation procedures, the 
output is a posterior distribution of possible parameter estimates, which can be more revealing 
than the point estimates returned by other methods. BMA is estimated as follows:  First, all 
permutations of a linear regression model are estimated using the set of explanatory variables, 𝑿. 
We refer to 𝑿𝛼 as a particular subset of variables in 𝑿, and in that sense, each distinct 𝑿𝛼 is a 
separate model. In the second step, a posterior parameter vector is constructed using a weighted 
average of all parameters estimated from the set of estimated models in step 1. Because some 
models explain the data better than others, posterior parameters are a weighted function of 
parameter estimates using posterior model probabilities (PMP), which describe how well a given 
model (with an associated 𝑿𝛼) explain the data. If the dimension of 𝑿 is 𝐾 –that is we can choose 
from 𝐾 possible explanatory variables to fit our model–this implies that BMA needs to estimate 
2𝐾 possible models to estimate every possible explanatory variable combination, a considerable 
computational undertaking. In practice, restricting estimation to a sample of the 2𝐾  possible 
model computations reduces model estimation to a manageable size.  
To give more structure to the problem, consider the problem of estimating a model of the form 
(10) 𝑦 = 𝛽0,𝛼 + 𝑋𝛼𝛽𝛼 + 𝜖𝛼 
where we must choose which set of variables 𝑋𝛼 ∈ 𝑿 should be included in a given regression. 
Using Bayes Rule, we can calculate the posterior model probability–a measure of the 
reasonableness of the coefficients used–as 
(11) 𝑝(𝑀𝛼|𝑦, 𝑋) =
𝑝(𝑦|𝑀𝛼 , 𝑋)𝑝(𝑀𝛼)
𝑝(𝑦|𝑀𝛼)
   
Where 𝑝(𝑀𝛼|𝑦, 𝑋) is the probability of the model given the data, or the posterior model 
probability; 𝑝(𝑦|𝑀𝛼 , 𝑋) is the probability of the outcome variable given the model and the set of 
covariates and 𝑝(𝑀𝛼) is the unconditional probability of the particular specification of the 
model, 𝑀𝛼. Using an application of the law of total probability we can rewrite the posterior 
model probability as 
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(12) 𝑝(𝑀𝛼|𝑦, 𝑋) =
𝑝(𝑦|𝑀𝛼 , 𝑋)𝑝(𝑀𝛼)
∑ 𝑝(𝑦|𝑀𝑗 , 𝑋)𝑝(𝑀𝑗) 2
𝐾
𝑗=1  
    
This leads to an expression for the model weighted posterior distribution for any estimator, 𝛽𝑘 as  
(13) 𝑝(𝛽𝑘|𝑦, 𝑋) = ∑ 𝑝(𝛽𝑘|𝑀𝛼 , 𝑦, 𝑋)𝑝(𝑀𝛼|𝑋, 𝑦)
2𝐾
𝛼=1    
The equation above shows that given the posterior model probability (PMP) we can estimate 
𝑝(𝛽𝑘|𝑦, 𝑋) −the probability that any estimator is included in the true model. The left hand side 
of equation is referred to as the posterior inclusion probability (PIP) and is reported a number 
between zero and one. The PIP reflects our relative confidence that the true model contains any 
particular variable. For example, if a variable has a PIP value of 1.0 this indicates that 100% of 
the weighted models include the variable 𝛽𝑘 as a regressor, giving us relative confidence that the 
true model contains this variable. From the posterior distributions we also recover the posterior 
mean–the posterior average of the coefficient–and the posterior standard deviation, which give 
us the weighted average and the weighted standard deviation of the coefficient estimates across 
estimated model.  
 
4. Data 
Our panel covers the sample period of 1970 – 2000. Country coverage varies based on data 
availability. Regarding variables considered, we include a large set of candidate variables that 
the literature has suggested as measures of trade frictions, making attempts to use the data 
sources most commonly employed. However, when faced with a choice we decide in favor of 
variables that are measured over the entire sample period. Summary statistics statistics  for the 
data used are presented in    Table 1. Data sources are summarized in Appendix Table A-1.   
   
4.1 List of Data Sources 
Measurement of Trade Intensity 
Real Bilateral Trade Flows For measures of trade intensity, we use the NBER-UN dataset of 
bilateral trade flows as described in Feenstra et al. (2005). The NBER-UN dataset offers several 
advantages: a long panel from 1962-2000, trade statistics covering all reported trading partners 
as collected by the United Nations, and construction using the more reliable import statistics 
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when these are available. In the few cases where import statistics are not available, Feenstra, et 
al. use export measures as reported by the trading partner. Since these data primarily use import 
statistics, the trade intensity data measure CIF trade flows.  
 
Gravity Variables 
Distance The defining features of a gravity equation are a positive relationship between trading 
partners size and trade intensity and an inverse relationship between distance and trade intensity. 
Several measures of geographical distance have been proposed and used, with no consensus in 
the literature as to which one is preferred.12  We consider four measures of distance, with a goal 
that the variable selection methods will provide evidence for which measure best explains trade 
volumes. Each distance measure is provided by the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et 
d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) (Mayer, and Zignago, 2011). The first distance measure is 
the natural log of distance between most populated cities -- the most standard distance measure 
employed in the empirical gravity literature. The second is the natural log of distance between 
capitals. The next two measures were developed by Head and Mayer (2002).  These measures 
are (i) the natural log of weighted distance and (ii) the natural log of CES-weighted distance. 
They calculate weighted distance as 
(14) 𝑑𝑖𝑗 = [∑ (
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑘
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖
)∑ (
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑙
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑗
) 𝑑𝑘𝑙
𝜃
𝑙∈𝑗 𝑘∈𝑖 ]
1/𝜃
 
where 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑘 measures the population of area 𝑘 in country 𝑖. For simple weighted distance, 𝜃 is 
set to 1. However, with CES weighted distance, 𝜃 is set to -1, which intentionally corresponds to 
the most frequently measured elasticity between trade and distance. Intuitively, these weighted 
distance metrics measure distance along the dimensions that matter: since good will eventually 
need to travel to where demand is located, these measures attempt to account for different 
dispersions in population densities.  
 
Product of GDPs Data on country GDP are from the Penn World Tables, version 7.1 (Heston, 
Summers and Aten 2012) and are expressed in constant US dollars. Our GDP product variable is 
constructed as the average of the logs of the two partners’ levels of real GDP.   
                                                 
12 See Disdier and Head (2008) for an illuminating meta-analysis on distance in gravity models. 
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Geographical Determinants of Trade 
Contiguous, Island, and Landlocked For geographical determinants of trade, we look at three 
widely used variables in the literature: (i) an indicator variable for whether the trading partners 
are contiguous–that is they are adjacent to each other; (ii) an indicator for whether either trading 
partner is an island, and (iii) an indicator for whether either trading partner is landlocked.  
 
Proxies for Cultural Distance 
Next we consider variables which proxy for, or are directly related to, cultural distance between 
trading partners. These determinants of trade rest on the affinity principle: countries find it 
advantageous to trade trade with countries that similar to themselves. Some of these variables, 
such as language, can be thought of informative of reduced trade costs through easier 
contracting, or reduced transaction costs. Other cultural variables might proxy for shared demand 
systems across populations.  
 
Share Official Language, 9%+ Speak Language  A language indicator is often included in 
gravity models of trade. One way to justify its inclusion is in reducing contracting and 
coordinating costs between trading partners, what we refer to as the direct mechanism of 
reducing trade costs. Because language is a specialized skill, it is not necessary for the majority 
of population to speak the language in order to exploit this channel of reduced trade costs. 
Therefore we consider the indicator for whether 9% of the population share a common language 
as a test for the direct reduction of trade costs through language. There is some support in the 
literature for broadening the scope of this common covariate. Melitz and Toubal (2014) estimate 
a model which adds linguistic proximity, shared native language, and spoken language to the 
usual official-language indicator variable.  They find that the inclusion of these variables results 
in trade impacts twice as large as with official language alone. The second language 
measurement we consider is whether the trading partners share an official language. This 
variable captures a sense of shared cultural background between trading partners, either through 
similarity of culture, or through shared historical past, during which one would have had much 
time to develop trading linkages.  
 
Religious Distance We consider religious distance as a proxy for shared culture between 
trading partners. Lewer and van de Berg (2007) construct a series of indicator variables for 
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shared majority religion and find trading partners who share religion have more trade. We take a 
slightly different approach and construct a continuous metric of similarity of religion that we 
define as religious distance. We parameterize religious distance as the Euclidean distance 
between the percent of the population in 16 different religious groups in the two countries, where 
these groups are defined by the World Religion Dataset13. A distance of 0 indicates that the 
trading partners have populations which have identical population fractions for each religious 
group; higher values of the distance variable indicate less religious similarity. 
 
Factor Endowments 
Human Capital, Physical Capital, and Arable Land Many theories of international trade 
predict that factor endowments should be correlated with trade.14  To measure the factor 
endowment of human capital we use the Barro-Lee (2013) statistics on the average years of 
schooling for the population over the age of 15. For physical capital, we define factor 
endowment as a measure of physical capital per worker.  Using data from the Penn World 
Tables, we calculate the value of capital stock measured at the current PPP exchange rate, 
divided by the number of employed persons in the economy. Finally, for the factor endowment 
for arable land is defined as arable land per worker, using data from the World Development 
Indicators.  For each measure of factor endowments (human capital; physical capital; arable 
land), the factor intensity for the trading pairs 𝑖 and 𝑗 is defined as  
 (15) 𝑓𝑡
{𝑖𝑗} = ln (𝐹𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑗𝑡) 
where Fit is the endowment of for country i in period t. Countries with similar factor 
endowments will have larger factor intensity measures.  
 
                                                 
13 The World Religion Dataset is available at and gives the percent of population in each of the 16 
different major religious groups for 192 countries covering 1945-2010. 
http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Downloads/WRDNATL_DL2.asp 
 
14 The Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts higher trade for countries with dissimilar factor 
endowments.  Models in the tradition of the “New Trade Theory” predict higher trade for 
countries with similar factor proportions.  For our purposes, we wish only to consider whether 
factor endowments robustly predict trade.  We do not propose our empirical analysis as a test 
of a particular model of international trade.   
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Impediments to Flows of Goods and Capital 
WTO/GATT Membership, Regional Trade Agreements Multilateral agreements, such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), are 
one method by which countries can commit to lower impediments to the flow of goods and 
capital. These trade organizations are tasked with the goal of increasing world trade, thus it is 
natural to posit that membership in these organizations has a positive effect on trade volumes. 
Rose (2004) estimated the effect of WTO/GATT membership on trade, parameterizing 
membership as an indicator for whether either trading partner are included in a trade agreement, 
and an indicator for whether both partners are in the WTO/GATT. He finds positive effects of 
membership. Baier and Bergstrand (2006) use a panel framework to attempt to address the 
endogeneity of membership within a free trade agreement, and find that the trade gains from 
membership are even larger than those found by Rose.  Subramanian and Wei (2007) find that 
WTO membership has a strong heterogeneous impact on trade, with effects largest when both 
trading partners are members, and further find that sectors which did not liberalize experienced 
no trade gains to WTO membership. We use WTO/GATT membership published by Centre 
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informacions Internationales (CEPII).  A very large number of 
trading partners in our dataset are members of the WTO/GATT: 96%. We also include an 
indicator for membership in a regional trade agreement, the data for which is courtesy of de 
Sousa (2012).  
 
Common Currency A shared currency between trading partners is widely believed to encourage 
trade. This was one of the main justifications for the introduction of the Euro in 1999. We use de 
Sousa's (2012) formulation of shared currency, which parameterizes the variable as equal to 1 if 
trading partners are part of an explicit or implied currency union. In an explicit currency union, 
the currency of one country circulates as legal tender in the second country. An implied currency 
union exists when one country maintains an explicit peg at a fixed rate of their currency to 
another country's currency. Note this does not include any other type of peg besides a fixed and 
maintained peg. Our summary tables show that 0.46% of trading partners in our sample share a 
common currency. The effect of a common currency on international trade has received more 
scrutiny than any other variable.  Several influential papers using data from 2000 and earlier (i.e., 
not including the Euro zone) found that countries with a common currency enjoyed a level of 
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trade from 110% higher to 577% higher, compared with countries that did not share a common 
currency.15 In their meta-analysis of studies that estimated this parameter, Rose and Stanley 
(2005) consider 34 separate studies that overall present 754 estimates of the common currency 
effect. They find that the mean estimate implies a 136% increase in trade, while the median 
estimate implies a 70% increase in trade.   
 
Capital Openness The degree to which capital can flow freely between countries may also affect 
trade. We utilize Chinn and Ito's (2007) index for financial liberalization, which is itself based on 
the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 
Their index is based on the series of binary indicator variables provided in the financial 
transactions of the AREAER, for a five year window in which the capital controls were not in 
effect. They define 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 𝑘,𝑡∈𝑲
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑(𝑲𝒕)
 where 𝑲𝒕 is the set of possible capital controls in year t. 
Their capital openness variable is the first standardized principal component of this share 
variable. We consider their openness index to be a parsimonious dimension reduction of a series 
of measures of capital controls projected into one dimension. Our summary tables show this 
variable has mean of 0.21 and varies from 0 (low financial openness) to 1 (high financial 
openness).  
 
Exchange Rate Measurements  
Exchange Rate Volatility, and Exchange Rate Regimes: Fixed Exchange Rate, Crawling 
Peg, or Moving Band Nominal exchange rate volatility has been shown to affect trade flows in 
models where firms set prices in advance (Broda and Romalis, 2003) and it has been tested 
empirically quite broadly. Nonetheless, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) in their review of the 
literature remark that there is “substantial consensus that the impact of exchange rate volatility 
on trade is very small at best, with even the sign uncertain (pg. 719.)” There are various ways to 
parameterize exchange rate volatility; we model exchange rate volatility as the residuals derived 
                                                 
15 In roughly chronological order, these are Rose (2001): 235% higher; Rose and van Wincoop (2001), 
136% to 297% higher; Frankel and Rose (2002) 371% higher; Glick and Rose (2002) 110% higher; and 
Barro and Tenreyo (2007), 577% higher.   
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from an 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1,3) process for yearly bilateral exchange rates. This variable shows a mean of 
0.35 and a standard deviation of 1.8.  
To measure the type of exchange rate regime, we use the IMF “coarse” classifications, as 
reported by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and subsequent updates. We define indicators for three 
exchange rate classifications: fixed exchange rate, crawling peg, and a moving band exchange 
rate regime. Each classification has two types: whether either trading partner employs this 
exchange rate regime, and whether both trading partner has this arrangement. In our sample, 
49% of country pairs are characterized by at least one country belonging to a fixed rate regime, 
with both countries on a fixed-rate regime in 9.5% of country pairs. Regarding a crawling peg, 
53% of the trading partners in our sample had at least one partner on a crawling peg exchange 
rate. Finally, 39% of the trading partners in our sample had at least one partner on a moving band 
exchange rate regime. 
 
Crises Episodes  
                           
Indicators for Debt, Banking and Currency Crises Debt, banking and currency crises 
disrupt and depress economic activity in general, therefore it’s likely that crises episodes have a 
large impact on trade flows between countries. We use the IMF’s Systematic Banking Crises 
Database–which also contains data on currency and debt crises–as developed by Laeven and 
Valencia (2008) and updated in Laeven and Valencia (2012). The authors define a banking crisis 
to exist if two conditions are met: 
“1) Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by 
significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations)  
2) Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in 
the banking system.” (p. 4) 
The authors record 147 banking crises since 1970. Their definition of a currency crisis is based 
on Frankel and Rose (1996). A currency crisis is defined as a nominal depreciation of the 
currency versus the US dollar of at least 30%. The authors find 218 events which qualify as 
currency crises during the time period of 1970-2011. The Laeven and Valencia definition of a 
debt crisis is based on information from Beim and Calomiris (2001), World Bank (2002), IMF 
reports and other agencies, and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006). The authors find 66 events 
that qualify as sovereign debt crises during the period 1970-2011.  
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Crises events are rare by definition. Since the effect of crisis on trade may not be immediate, we 
define an indicator variable taking the value one if either trading partner experienced a crisis 
within the previous three-year window and zero otherwise. Using this definition,  5.6% of the 
sample is characterized by at least one partner experiencing a debt crisis. For banking crises, this 
number is 15%, and is 19% for currency crises.  
5. Results  
The main results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. All specifications include year, exporter, and 
importer fixed effects.16   Table 2 presents the coefficient estimates for OLS, Lasso and Post-
Lasso, while Table 3 presents the results for Bayesian Model Averaging and Extreme Bound 
Analysis. We consider a variable to be Lasso robust if it remains non-zero after Lasso Bayesian 
shrinkage, BMA robust if it has a posterior inclusion probability (PIP) of greater than 0.5, and 
EBA robust if the estimate upper bound and lower bound do not contain zero.  
Table 2 compares OLS and Lasso estimates.  Of the 31 covariates in the candidate set of 
variables (excluding the intercept),OLS regression finds that 26 of these variables are statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  However, only 17 are Lasso robust. Table 3 shows that 18 are BMA 
robust and 19 are EBA robust.18  Together, the three methods suggest a more parsimonious 
model of the determinants of bilateral trade than would be implied by standard application of 
OLS.  
 
Figure 1 presents histograms of the distribution of estimated regression coefficients for the EBA 
method, where the vertical red line shows where zero sits in the distribution. These distributions 
can be highly informative; some variables, such as the landlocked indicator show a tight 
coefficient distribution, indicating across almost all reasonable specifications we can expect the 
coefficient estimate to lie within this range. Other variables, such as regional trade agreement, 
                                                 
16 We present the results for alternative fixed effect specifications in Appendix tables A-2, A-3, and A-4.  
18 We consider a variable Lasso robust if it remains non-zero after Lasso Bayesian shrinkage, BMA robust 
if it has a posterior inclusion probability (PIP) of greater than 0.5, and EBA robust if the estimate upper 
bound and lower bound do not contain zero. 
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show a bimodal coefficient distribution, suggesting this parameter has heterogenous effects that 
may depend on other included covariates.  
 
Figure 2 presents the posterior model probabilities from BMA, showing the most likely model 
specifications with their accompanying probabilities. The model with the highest estimated 
posterior model probability has a 17% posterior probability, and includes 19 variables (excluding 
the variables of banking crisis, crawling peg, moving band, fixed exchange rate, official common 
language, and currency crisis). The second most likely model has a 16% posterior probability, 
and includes all the variables in the previous model and includes a crawling peg indicator. The 
third most likely model 15% posterior model probability and includes all of the variables of the 
previous model, but includes an indicator for banking crises. Together, these three models have a 
cumulative probability of 48%. Note that after 70% cumulative model probability the models 
appear to fragment, with many models having small fractional posterior probabilities.  
Figure 3 shows the shrinkage path of the Lasso coefficients. The y-axis presents the standardized 
coefficient value as the value of the shrinkage parameter, lambda, varies. The OLS solution 
corresponds to the left-most position on the x-axis. As the lambda parameter increases, and we 
move to the right on the x-axis, variables are shrunk towards zero. For any given value of lambda 
some coefficients will be estimated to be zero, thus for each value of lambda positive y-values 
correspond to variables selected via Lasso. The shrinkage path – that is the order in which 
variables are shrunk to zero -- is informative of which variables have the largest explanatory 
power. For example, for very large values of lambda, log of weighted distance remains while 
many other variables have been shrunk to zero.   
 
Gravity Variables 
Estimation via Lasso we find two out of the four candidate variables were not shrunk to zero: 
weighted distance and CES distance, with coefficients of -0.994 and -0.133 respectively. In 
comparison, OLS considers distance and weighted distance highly significant, with the log of 
distance having a puzzling positive coefficient. If we add the Lasso robust coefficients we get a 
combined elasticity of distance on trade of -1.127. This is slightly larger than the average 
elasticity of -0.907 as found in Disdier and Head’s meta-analysis of 1,467 gravity models. 
Disdier and Head find that papers using earlier data tend to have smaller coefficients, and an 
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average coefficient size of 0.9, 0.96, and 0.95 in decades 1970s, 1980s and 1990s respectively. 
Because BMA and EBA methods are less robust to the inclusion of highly correlated variables, 
we chose only one of the two Lasso robust distance measures to test using BMA and EBA. Using 
Bayesian model averaging we estimate a coefficient on CES weighted distance of -1.113. The 
posterior inclusion probability (PIP) is 1, meaning that 100% of the weighted posterior models 
included distance in the final model. The posterior standard deviation of the estimated coefficient 
is 0.007, indicating a small amount of variation across models. Finally using EBA, we find an 
upper bound and lower bound range of (-1.34 to -1.1), within the range of significance suggested 
by EBA. Lasso shrinks the product of GDPs to an estimated 0.559 from the OLS estimate of 
0.729. Using Post-Lasso, the estimate rises to 0.636. BMA shows the product of GDPs to be a 
tightly estimated 0.739, very close to the OLS estimate. This variable is also robust under EBA 
with an estimated range of (0.75, 0.99). 
 
Geographical Determinants 
All of the geographical determinants variables are robust according to the three methods used. 
OLS estimates the contiguous dummy’s coefficient as 0.614, while Lasso gives an estimate of 
0.431. BMA agrees with the Lasso estimate, giving a mean estimate of 0.405 which is on the 
lower end of EBA’s estimate range from 0.37 to 0.69.  
 
Proxies for Cultural Distance 
Both language variables considered remain non-zero after Lasso shrinkage. The coefficient on 
official language is estimated at 0.066 and the coefficient on 9% speak is estimated at 0.296. 
Egger and Lassmann (2012), in a meta-analysis of 701 coefficients culled from 81 published 
articles, find an average coefficient of 0.49, considerably smaller than our estimate, even when 
one combines the two different language estimates. Our Post-Lasso estimate, is estimated at 
0.047 for official language and at 0.327 for 9%+ population, also smaller than the literature 
average. The estimate from BMA show a posterior inclusion probability of 0.031, meaning only 
3.1% of the weighted posterior models included this variable. EBA, however, shows robustness 
of official language, with an estimated coefficient range between 0.19 and 0.78. This variable’s 
counterpart, 9%+ population, however, is robust according to BMA with an estimated PIP of 1, 
and according to EBA which shows an estimated range of 0.21 and 0.76.  
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Both former colony and common colonizer appear strongly robust in the Lasso regression model, 
with coefficients of 0.738 and 0.319 respectively. The post-Lasso estimate highly significant 
with slightly larger coefficients of 0.867 and 0.394. This estimate is roughly on par with the 
coefficient estimated by Frankel and Rose (2002), and with the coefficient estimate of 0.45 in 
Glick and Rose (2002). The BMA and EBA show similar robustness of these covariates. Former 
colony is robust according to BMA with an estimated PIP of 1 and an estimated post-mean of 
0.866. EBA gives the upper bound and lower bound range of (0.86,1.36). Common colonizer has 
an estimated PIP of 1 and a post mean estimate of 0.413, roughly similar to the post-Lasso 
estimate. The EBA estimate shows robustness with a rather large estimated range of (0.35 to 
0.77). Though no meta-analysis exists for this coefficient, our estimate for former colony seems 
smaller than the coefficient on this covariate estimated previously, such as in Rose (2004) who 
estimates a coefficient of 1.28 for post-1970, or Rose and van Wincoop (2001) who find a 
coefficient of 1.74.  
 
The estimated Lasso coefficient on common legal origin is 0.25, and has a post-Lasso coefficient 
of 0.286, which is nearly identical to the OLS estimate of 0.282. This estimate is similar in 
magnitude to others in the literature, such as 0.306 estimated by Head, Mayer and Ries (2010) or 
0.410 estimated Felbermayr and Toubal (2009). The post-mean estimate from BMA is very 
similar in magnitude, estimated at 0.287, with an accompanying PIP of 1. The EBA range of 
(0.27,0.51) indicates this variable is considered robust according to that method. Religious 
distance has an OLS estimate of -0.209, and using Lasso we get a coefficient of -0.174. Given 
that this is an index, it’s hard to interpret the magnitude of this coefficient, but given that the 
standard deviation of this index varies is 0.69 in our sample, moving one standard deviation of 
religiously dissimilarity is predicted to decrease aggregate trade flows between partners by 
11%20. The Post-Lasso coefficient estimate is -0.215 and is significant at the canonical levels. 
This variable is also robust according to BMA and EBA. BMA gives a posterior inclusion 
probability (PMP) of 1 with a post-mean coefficient of -0.216 and a standard deviation of 0.009. 
EBA further finds this variable robust and gives a range of (-0.3,-0.17). In comparison to other 
                                                 
20 Assuming a marginal effect from 0 to 0.69.  
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work in the literature, our findings suggest a stronger effect of religious similarity than previous 
estimates (Linders et al., 2005) who estimate a coefficient of 0.22 for (binary) religious similarity 
between trading partners. Some of this difference may be coming from the continuous versus 
discrete parameterization of this variable, however when taken at face value our estimate implies 
a larger response to religious similarity and trade.  
 
Factor Endowments  
All three factor endowment variables – human capital, physical capital, and arable land -- are 
statistically significant using OLS with coefficients of 0.742, -0.129, and -0.231 respectively. 
Lasso selects only human capital and arable land, with coefficients of 0.389 and -0.15. Using 
BMA, all three variables have PIP of 1, and EBA finds all three robust. Human capital shows a 
BMA post-mean of 0.75, and an EBA range from (0.78, 1.37), consistent with the OLS 
coefficient estimate. Physical capital shows a BMA post-mean of -0.132 and an estimated EBA 
range of (-0.18, -0.09). Finally arable land shows a BMA post-mean of -0.229 and an estimated 
EBA range of (-0.41, -0.27).  
 
Impediments to the Flows of Goods and Capital 
WTO/GATT and common currency indicator are robust across all three methods. Exchange rate 
volatility is robust according to BMA, but not when using Lasso or EBA. Regional trade 
agreements and capital openness are not significant in any of the specifications. For capital 
openness, While OLS estimates a coefficient of -0.00298, Lasso estimation estimates a zero 
coefficient. This result is mirrored in the results for BMA, which estimates a zero PIP, and EBA, 
which estimates a range of coefficient values of (-0.21,0.04), which is not robust according to the 
method. This was a surprising result, as the degree to which capital can flow freely seems to a 
priori affect real trade flows. However, the appendix tables provide some guidance to answer this 
puzzle. Consider appendix table A-2, which presents the Lasso results varying fixed effect 
specifications. Note that capital openness is robust when either importer fixed effects or year 
fixed effects are not employed. This is also mirrored in the appendix tables A-3 and A-4, for 
BMA and EBA respectively. It appears that while capital openness is predictive of trade flows in 
the cross section, most of this variation is due to country-specific effects that are captured in the 
importer fixed effects. This suggests that although capital openness remains important, what 
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matters more is the political and economic environment within a country that determines the 
degree of capital openness.  
 
WTO/GATT membership looks strongly robust across methods. OLS estimates a significant 
coefficient of 0.335, Lasso estimates a coefficient of 0.171, and BMA estimates post-mean of 
0.348. This compares to the coefficient estimated by Rose (2004) in column 4 of table 1 of 0.15, 
which is closer to the Lasso result than the OLS estimates. Regarding common currency, OLS 
estimates a coefficient of 0.448, which Lasso shrinks to 0.109. The BMA post-mean is 0.353 
with a PIP of 1, and EBA estimates a range of (0.11, 0.84). Frankel and Rose (2002) estimate a 
coefficients on currency union membership which range from 1.36 to 1.55, which are 
substantially larger than our estimates.  
 
Exchange Rate Measurements 
Using OLS, all of the exchange rate variables are statistically significant from zero. However, 
there is large agreement across methods, showing only either crawling peg being robust. Lasso 
selects only either crawling peg indicator as robust and the rest are set to zero. Using BMA, 
exchange rate volatility, and either crawling peg have PIPs of 1 with estimated coefficients of -
0.012 and 0.153 respectively. Both fixed exchange rate has a PIP of 0.893 with an estimated 
post-mean of 0.071 and either moving band has a PIP of 0.048. Using EBA only either fixed 
exchange rate and either crawling peg are robust, with estimated ranges of (-0.14, -0.02) and 
(0.06, 0.18) respectively. The differences in statistical robustness between OLS and the other 
methods are stark. We can only speculate as to the reason for the differences. Our hypothesis is 
that OLS may be fitting a significant amount of noise that it interprets as signal, which the other 
methods do not.  
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Crisis Measurements 
Estimating using OLS we see that of the three crisis episodes considered—debt, banking, or 
currency—only banking crisis is significant at the standard levels, showing a positive coefficient 
of 0.0513. However, when estimating via Lasso and applying Bayesian shrinkage this variable is 
estimated at zero and thus is not considered robust according to Lasso. Using Bayesian Model 
Averaging, we see that the presence of a debt crisis has a PIP of 0, indicating no probability of 
inclusion in the true model. The PIP of banking crisis is on the cusp of robustness, showing a 
value of 0.481 and a post-mean of 0.021. Currency crisis shows a near-zero PIP of 0.006 and a 
post-mean indistinguishable from zero. Estimating via EBA, we see that neither debt crisis nor 
currency crisis are robust according to EBA. However, banking crisis is, showing a range of 
estimated coefficient values of (0.02,0.1). The positive coefficient on banking crisis is slightly 
puzzling, and given the window of this variable of 3 years, this may indicate that we are picking 
up the “rebound” period when trade returns to trend after a crisis.  
 
To be sure, this is not to say that crisis episodes considered here do not necessarily have an 
impact on trade. When estimating trade flows without using year fixed effects (seen in tables A-
2, A-3, and A-4) banking and currency crises are consistently negative and robust. Our results do 
not preclude the possibility that all worldwide trade is depressed during periods of banking and 
currency crises. That is to say, it is possible from viewing these results that all countries lose out 
during banking and currency crisis episodes, not just those that experience the crises themselves. 
There appears to be some support for this thesis, as shown in Shelburne (2010) who looks at 
trade decline during the global financial crisis from 2007-2010. How much is worldwide trade 
depressed? Our results indicate quite a lot. EBA shows the coefficient on banking crisis varies 
from -0.52 to -0.3, even when controlling for exporter and importer fixed effects. This translates 
to a marginal effect of -40% to -25.9% per trading partner, which indicates almost implausibly 
large aggregate declines. For currency crisis, the coefficient varies from -0.44 to -0.23 indicating 
marginal effects on trade of -35.6% to -20.5%.  
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6. Conclusion  
How do the three variable selection methods refine the set of variables that should define the 
workhorse empirical gravity model?   First, our result reject the robustness of roughly a fifth of 
the variables in the candidate set for which OLS does not reject the null hypothesis. Second, the 
set of robust variables is remarkably consistent across the three model selection methodologies.    
 
Table 3 shows relative agreement across methods. Very few variables appear highly significant 
using one method while not very significant in others. In particular Lasso and EBA show very 
similar results qualitatively, differing in parameter inclusion significance for only 4 variables.  
 
Table 4 show the results across methods. A mark in the table indicates that the variable is robust 
according to that particular method.  Specifically, for lasso, a mark indicates a non-zero 
coefficient.  For EBA, a mark indicates that the upper and lower bound do not include zero. For 
Bayesian Model Averaging, a mark indicates a 50% or great PIP.  Overall, our results show that 
model selection methods that balance “fit” and “prediction” are straightforward to employ; give 
a consistent set of results, at least in the context of the gravity model; and that these methods 
represent the best current solution to the problem of variable selection in potentially a wide 
variety of contexts.  
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    Table 1: Summary Statistics  
  count mean sd min max 
Trade Intensity 
Ln of Real Bilateral Trade Flows 152,213 17.0 2.97 8.14 26.4 
Gravity 
ln Dist 152,213 8.70 0.78 4.09 9.89 
ln of Dist between Capitals 152,213 8.70 0.78 4.09 9.89 
ln of Weighted Distance 152,213 8.71 0.77 4.74 9.89 
ln of CES Weighted Distance 152,213 8.70 0.79 4.66 9.89 
Product of GDPs 152,213 22.8 2.29 14.4 31.6 
Geographical Determinants 
Contiguous 152,213 0.025 0.16 0 1 
Either Island 152,213 0.042 0.20 0 1 
Either Landlocked 152,213 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Proxies for Cultural Distance 
Share Official Language 152,213 0.16 0.37 0 1 
9%+ Speak Language 152,213 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Former Colony 152,213 0.034 0.18 0 1 
Common Colonizer 152,213 0.060 0.24 0 1 
Common Legal Origin 152,213 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Religious Distance 152,213 0.70 0.69 0 2.14 
Factor Endowments 
Human Capital (product) 152,213 1.54 0.40 0.099 2.48 
Physical Capital (product) 152,213 21.1 1.77 13.4 24.9 
Arable Land (product) 152,213 -3.21 1.83 -14.3 2.13 
Impediments to the Flows of Goods and Capital 
WTO/GATT 152,213 0.96 0.19 0 1 
Regional Trade Agreement 152,213 0.051 0.22 0 1 
Common Currency 152,213 0.0046 0.068 0 1 
Capital Openness 152,213 0.21 0.26 0 1 
Exchange Rate Measurements 
Exchange Rate Volatility 152,213 0.35 1.80 0.035 65.0 
Either Fixed Exchange Rate 152,213 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Both Fixed Exchange Rate 152,213 0.095 0.29 0 1 
Either Crawling Peg Exch Rate 152,213 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Both Crawling Peg Exchange 
Rate 
152,213 
0.090 0.29 0 1 
Either Moving Band Exch Rate 152,213 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Both Moving Band Exchange 
Rate 
152,213 
0.045 0.21 0 1 
Crisis Measurements 
Debt Crisis 3yr Window 152,213 0.056 0.23 0 1 
Banking Crisis 3yr Window 152,213 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Currency Crisis 3yr Window 152,213 0.19 0.39 0 1 
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Table 2:  OLS and Lasso 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
Variable OLS  Lasso   Post Lasso 
ln Dist 0.500***  0   
ln of Dist between Capitals 0.201  0   
ln of Weighted Dist -1.875***  -0.994  -1.690*** 
ln of CES Weighted Dist 0.0205  -0.133  0.534*** 
ln of Product of GDPs 0.729***  0.559  0.636*** 
Contiguous 0.614***  0.431  0.601*** 
Either Island 0.475***  0.337  0.476*** 
Either Landlocked -0.531***  -0.211  -0.520*** 
Share Official Language 0.0646*  0.066  0.0470 
9%+ Speak Language 0.311***  0.296  0.327*** 
Former Colony 0.855***  0.738  0.867*** 
Common Colonizer 0.396***  0.319  0.394*** 
Common Legal Origin 0.282***  0.25  0.286*** 
Religious Distance -0.209***  -0.174  -0.215*** 
Human Capital (product) 0.742***  0.389  0.707*** 
Physical Capital (product) -0.129***  0   
Arable Land (product) -0.231***  -0.15  -0.249*** 
WTO/GATT 0.335***  0.171  0.353*** 
Regional Trade Agreement -0.00572  0   
Common Currency 0.448***  0.109  0.481*** 
Capital Openness -0.00298  0   
Exchange Rate Volatility -0.0120***  0   
Either Fixed Exch Rate 0.0414**  0   
Both Fixed Exch Rate 0.0949***  0   
Either Crawling Peg Exch Rate 0.177***  0.073  0.130*** 
Both Crawling Peg Exch Rate 0.0814***  0   
Either Moving Band Exch Rate 0.0758***  0   
Both Moving Band Exch Rate 0.0871***  0   
Debt Crisis 3yr Window -0.0159  0   
Banking Crisis 3yr Window 0.0513***  0   
Currency Crisis 3yr Window -0.0142  0   
Constant 0.0668***  0.064  0.0667*** 
Observations 152,213   152,213   152,213 
Notes:  Dependent variable is the log of real bilateral trade flows for all regression 
specifications. All regressions include year, exporter, and importer fixed effects. For OLS, t 
statistics are presented in parentheses. Robust standard errors.  T-statistics are hidden in this 
version of the table.             *p<0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p<0.001 
Table 3: Bayesian Model Averaging and Extreme Bound Analysis Baseline Results 
  Bayesian Model Averaging   
Extreme Bound 
Analysis 
 PIP Post Mean Post SD  UB to LB Robust 
ln of CES Weighted Dist 1 -1.113 0.007  (-1.34,-1.1) y 
Product of GDPs 1 0.736 0.016  (0.75,0.99) y 
Contiguous 1 0.405 0.031  (0.37,0.69) y 
Either Island 1 0.488 0.026  (0.46,0.77) y 
Either Landlocked 1 -0.514 0.047  (-0.67,-0.38) y 
Share Official Language 0.031 0.002 0.011  (0.19,0.78) y 
9%+ Speak Language 1 0.364 0.017  (0.21,0.76) y 
Former Colony 1 0.866 0.027  (0.83,1.36) y 
Common Colonizer 1 0.413 0.023  (0.35,0.77) y 
Common Legal Origin 1 0.287 0.011  (0.27,0.51) y 
Religious Distance 1 -0.216 0.009  (-0.3,-0.17) y 
Human Capital (product) 1 0.75 0.068  (0.78,1.37) y 
Physical Capital (product) 1 -0.132 0.012  (-0.18,-0.09) y 
Arable Land (product) 1 -0.229 0.018  (-0.41,-0.27) y 
WTO/GATT 1 0.348 0.025  (0.12,0.41) y 
Regional Trade Agreement 0 0 0  (-0.18,0.07) n 
Common Currency 1 0.353 0.062  (0.11,0.84) y 
Capital Openness 0 0 0  (-0.21,0.04) n 
Exchange Rate Volatility 1 -0.012 0.002  (-0.01,0) n 
Either Fixed Exch Rate 0.051 0.002 0.01  (-0.14,-0.02) y 
Both Fixed Exch Rate 0.893 0.071 0.031  (-0.1,0.1) n 
Either Crawling Peg ER 1 0.153 0.015  (0.06,0.18) y 
Both Crawling Peg ER 0.449 0.027 0.032  (-0.09,0.07) n 
Either Moving Band ER 0.924 0.048 0.02  (-0.02,0.11) n 
Both Moving Band ER 0.174 0.013 0.029  (-0.07,0.14) n 
Debt Crisis 3yr Window 0 0 0  (-0.08,0.04) n 
Banking Crisis 3yr Window 0.481 0.021 0.024  (0.02,0.1) y 
Currency Crisis 3yr Window 0.006 0 0.002  (-0.06,0.03) n 
Dependent variable is real bilateral trade flows between trading partners. All specifications include exporter, 
importer, year fixed effects. PIP is the “posterior inclusion probability” and reflects our relative confidence that the 
true model contains any particular regressor. Post Mean is the weighted average over the posterior estimates of the 
regressor. Post SD is the standard deviation of coefficient's posterior distribution. LB refers to highest value of the 
parameter in all of the models estimated, UB refers to the highest value of the parameter estimated. Leamer 
considers an estimate “robust” if its highest and lowest estimated value does not include zero. 
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Table 4: Summary of Variable Robustness Across Methods 
  OLS Lasso BMA EBA 
ln Dist ▪  ▪ ▪ 
ln of Dist between Capitals   ▪ ▪ 
ln of Weighted Distance ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
ln of CES Weighted Distance  ▪ ▪ ▪ 
Product of GDPs ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
Contiguous ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
Either Island ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
Either Landlocked ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
Share Official Language ▪ ▪  ▪ 
9%+ Speak Language ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
Former Colony ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
Common Colonizer ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
Common Legal Origin ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
Religious Distance ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
Human Capital (product) ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
Physical Capital (product) ▪  ▪ ▪ 
Arable Land (product) ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
WTO/GATT ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
Regional Trade Agreement     
Common Currency ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
Capital Openness     
Exchange Rate Volatility ▪  ▪  
Either Fixed Exchange Rate ▪   ▪ 
Both Fixed Exchange Rate ▪  ▪  
Either Crawling Peg Exch Rate ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
Both Crawling Peg Exchange Rate ▪    
Either Moving Band Exch Rate ▪  ▪  
Both Moving Band Exchange Rate ▪    
Debt Crisis 3yr Window     
Banking Crisis 3yr Window ▪  ▪ ▪ 
Currency Crisis 3yr Window         
 
Robust Determinants of Bilateral Trade 
 
 32 
Figure 1:  Distributions of parameter estimates generated by Extreme Bounds Analysis 
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Figure shows histograms of coefficient probability densities from Extreme Bounds Analysis 
estimation. The vertical red line shows where zero lies on the x-axis. Blue lines show the kernel density 
smoothed histograms.  
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Figure 2: Bayesian Model Averaging, Posterior Model Probabilities 
Figure shows posterior model probabilities and the associated variables included 
in the models. Variables shaded red have negative estimated coefficients; blue 
shading indicates positive estimated coefficients. Blank shading indicates 
variable not included in the given model.  
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Figure 3: Shrinkage Path for Lasso Estimation 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
 
Table A-1: List of Data Sources 
  Measure Source Citation 
 Ln of Real Bilateral Trade Flows NBER-UN Feenstra et al. (2005)  
Gravity     
1 Ln Distance) CEPII Mayer, T. & Zignago, S. (2011) 
2 Product of Trading Partners GDPs PWT 7.1 
Heston, Summers, and Aten 
(2012) 
Geographical Determinants      
3 Contiguous CEPII Mayer, T. & Zignago, S. (2011) 
4 Either Island CIA World Factbook CIA World Factbook 
5 Either Landlocked CIA World Factbook CIA World Factbook 
Proxies for Cultural Distance     
6 Share Official Language CEPII Mayer, T. & Zignago, S. (2011) 
7 9%+ Speak Language CEPII Mayer, T. & Zignago, S. (2011) 
8 Former Colony CEPII Mayer, T. & Zignago, S. (2011) 
9 Common Colonizer CEPII Mayer, T. & Zignago, S. (2011) 
10 Common Legal Origin CEPII Mayer, T. & Zignago, S. (2011) 
11 Religious Distance World Religion World Religion Dataset 
Factor Endowments     
12 Human Capital (product) Barro-Lee Barro-Lee (2013) 
13 Physical Capital World Bank WDI World Bank WDI 
14 Arable Land (product) World Bank WDI World Bank WDI 
Impediments to Flows of Goods and Capital     
15 WTO/GATT CEPII Mayer, T. & Zignago, S. (2011) 
16 Regional Trade Agreement de Sousa de Sousa (2012a) 
17 Common Currency de Sousa de Sousa (2012b) 
18 Capital Openness Chinn-Ito Chinn and Ito (2007) 
Exchange Rate Measurements     
19 Exchange Rate Volatility Author’s Estimates  
20 Either Fixed Exch Rate R&R Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
21 Both Fixed Exch Rate R&R Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
22 Either Crawling Peg Exchange Rate R&R Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
23 Both Crawling Peg Exchange Rate R&R Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
24 Either Moving Band Exchange Rate R&R Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
25 Both Moving Band Exchange Rate R&R Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
Crisis Measurements      
26 Debt Crisis 3yr Window IMF Financial Crises  Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
27 Banking Crisis 3yr Window IMF Financial Crises  Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
28 Currency Crisis 3yr Window IMF Financial Crises  Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
 
  
Robust Determinants of Bilateral Trade 
 
 36 
Table A-2: Lasso Estimation, Varying Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
lambda.1se 0.02211 0.02526 0.02024 0.01907 0.02834 
(Intercept) 1.189 0.122 0.322 0.063 0.064 
ln Distance 0 0 0 0 0 
ln of Dist between Capitals 0 0 0 0 0 
ln of Weighted Dist 0 -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.994 
ln of CES Weighted Dist -0.854 -1.045 -0.89 -0.937 -0.133 
Product of GDPs 0.802 0.763 0.845 0.919 0.559 
Contiguous 0.548 0.283 0.657 0.584 0.431 
Either Island 0.612 0.596 0.626 0.314 0.337 
Either Landlocked -0.423 -0.673 -0.341 -0.037 -0.211 
Share Official Language 0.222 0 0.188 0.388 0.066 
9%+ Speak Language 0.192 0.292 0.241 0.016 0.296 
Former Colony 1.066 1.077 0.9 0.832 0.738 
Common Colonizer 0.105 0.158 0.211 0.304 0.319 
Common Legal Origin 0.122 0.192 0.107 0.175 0.25 
Religious Distance -0.132 -0.123 -0.186 -0.178 -0.174 
Human Capital (product) -0.346 -0.4 -0.462 1.06 0.389 
Physical Capital (product) 0.232 0.213 0.248 0.095 0 
Arable Land (product) -0.046 -0.031 -0.002 -0.11 -0.15 
WTO/GATT 0.357 0.186 0.277 0.377 0.171 
Regional Trade Agreement 0.394 0.292 0.215 0.273 0 
Common Currency 0.5 0.165 0.329 0.388 0.109 
Capital Openness 0.555 0.042 0.231 0.694 0 
Exchange Rate Volatility 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Either Fixed Exch Rate 0 0 -0.013 0 0 
Both Fixed Exch Rate 0.081 0 0.037 0.013 0 
Either Crawling Peg ER 0 0.012 0 0.011 0.073 
Both Crawling Peg ER -0.048 0 0 0 0 
Either Moving Band ER 0.029 0 0.004 0 0 
Both Moving Band ER 0 0 0 0 0 
Debt Crisis 3yr Window 0 0 0 0 0 
Banking Crisis 3yr Window -0.348 -0.268 -0.278 0 0 
Currency Crisis 3yr Window -0.273 -0.225 -0.221 -0.056 0 
Exporter FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Importer FEs No No Yes No Yes 
Year FEs No No No Yes Yes 
N 152213 152213 152213 152213 152213 
𝑅2 56% 50.40% 49.70% 54% 26.30% 
 
  
Table A-3: Bayesian Model Averaging, Varying Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
PIP 
Post 
Mean 
Post 
SD 
PIP 
Post 
Mean 
Post 
SD 
PIP 
Post 
Mean 
Post 
SD 
ln of CES Weighted Dist 1 -0.883 0.008 1 -0.943 0.008 1 -1.113 0.007 
Product of GDPs 1 0.861 0.003 1 0.932 0.003 1 0.736 0.016 
Contiguous 1 0.734 0.035 1 0.664 0.033 1 0.405 0.031 
Either Island 1 0.736 0.028 1 0.379 0.026 1 0.488 0.026 
Either Landlocked 1 -0.368 0.018 0.992 -0.08 0.019 1 -0.514 0.047 
Share Official Language 1 0.189 0.029 1 0.416 0.016 0.031 0.002 0.011 
9%+ Speak Language 1 0.268 0.027 0 0 0 1 0.364 0.017 
Former Colony 1 0.942 0.03 1 0.892 0.028 1 0.866 0.027 
Common Colonizer 1 0.273 0.026 1 0.368 0.023 1 0.413 0.023 
Common Legal Origin 1 0.122 0.012 1 0.2 0.011 1 0.287 0.011 
Religious Distance 1 -0.227 0.009 1 -0.202 0.008 1 -0.216 0.009 
Human Capital (product) 1 -0.788 0.026 1 1.132 0.029 1 0.75 0.068 
Physical Capital (product) 1 0.299 0.006 1 0.085 0.006 1 -0.132 0.012 
Arable Land (product) 0.589 -0.008 0.008 1 -0.125 0.004 1 -0.229 0.018 
WTO/GATT 1 0.439 0.028 1 0.484 0.027 1 0.348 0.025 
Regional Trade Agreement 1 0.276 0.026 1 0.309 0.025 0 0 0 
Common Currency 1 0.484 0.073 1 0.574 0.069 1 0.353 0.062 
Capital Openness 1 0.314 0.025 1 0.715 0.024 0 0 0 
Exchange Rate Volatility 0.201 0.002 0.003 0.519 0.005 0.005 1 -0.012 0.002 
Either Fixed Exch Rate 1 -0.088 0.017 0.966 0.056 0.016 0.051 0.002 0.01 
Both Fixed Exch Rate 1 0.114 0.02 1 0.149 0.02 0.893 0.071 0.031 
Either Crawling Peg ER 0 0 0 1 0.105 0.013 1 0.153 0.015 
Both Crawling Peg ER 0.53 -0.041 0.042 0.017 0.001 0.005 0.449 0.027 0.032 
Either Moving Band ER 0.56 0.028 0.027 1 0.063 0.013 0.924 0.048 0.02 
Both Moving Band ER 0 0 0 0.026 0.002 0.011 0.174 0.013 0.029 
Debt Crisis 3yr Window 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Banking Crisis 3yr Window 1 -0.309 0.015 0.351 -0.016 0.024 0.481 0.021 0.024 
Currency Crisis 3yr Window 1 -0.26 0.014 1 -0.079 0.014 0.006 0 0.002 
Exporter FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Importer FEs Yes No Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes 
Dependent variable is bilateral trade flows between trading partners. PIP is the “posterior inclusion probability” and 
reflects our relative confidence that the true model contains any particular regressor. For example, if PIP = 1 this 
indicates that in 100% of the weighted models include this variable as a regressor. Post Mean is the weighted average 
over the posterior estimates of the regressor. Post SD is the standard deviation of coefficient's posterior distribution 
 
 
Table A-4: Extreme Bound Analysis, Varying Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 UB to LB Robust UB to LB Robust UB to LB Robust 
(Intercept) (0.03,0.12) y (-0.01,0.07) n (0.05,0.08) y 
ln of CES Weighted Dist (-1.18,-0.93) y (-1.2,-0.94) y (-1.34,-1.1) y 
Product of GDPs (0.82,0.96) y (0.89,1.07) y (0.75,0.99) y 
Contiguous (0.52,1.04) y (0.38,0.99) y (0.37,0.69) y 
Either Island (0.69,1.18) y (0.52,1.18) y (0.46,0.77) y 
Either Landlocked (-0.64,-0.36) y (-0.38,-0.02) y (-0.67,-0.38) y 
Share Official Language (0.31,0.83) y (0.4,0.87) y (0.19,0.78) y 
9%+ Speak Language (0.14,0.77) y (0.01,0.78) y (0.21,0.76) y 
Former Colony (0.99,1.54) y (0.89,1.44) y (0.83,1.36) y 
Common Colonizer (0.11,0.66) y (0.06,0.81) y (0.35,0.77) y 
Common Legal Origin (0.11,0.43) y (0.08,0.48) y (0.27,0.51) y 
Religious Distance (-0.34,-0.16) y (-0.44,-0.15) y (-0.3,-0.17) y 
Human Capital (product) (-1,0.47) n (1,1.89) y (0.78,1.37) y 
Physical Capital (product) (0.17,0.38) y (0.07,0.36) y (-0.18,-0.09) y 
Arable Land (product) (-0.08,0) n (-0.18,-0.09) y (-0.41,-0.27) y 
WTO/GATT (0.05,0.48) y (0.25,0.85) y (0.12,0.41) y 
Regional Trade 
Agreement 
(0.06,0.53) y (0.17,0.74) y (-0.18,0.07) n 
Common Currency (0.39,1.24) y (0.31,1.31) y (0.11,0.84) y 
Capital Openness (0.25,0.84) y (0.85,1.54) y (-0.21,0.04) n 
Exchange Rate Volatility (-0.02,0.01) n (-0.01,0.01) n (-0.01,0) n 
Either Fixed Exch Rate (-0.12,0.06) n (-0.15,0.14) n (-0.14,-0.02) y 
Both Fixed Exch Rate (0.07,0.33) y (-0.06,0.25) n (-0.1,0.1) n 
Either Crawling Peg ER (-0.07,0.13) n (-0.04,0.14) n (0.06,0.18) y 
Both Crawling Peg ER (-0.15,0.06) n (-0.16,0.09) n (-0.09,0.07) n 
Either Moving Band ER (-0.03,0.13) n (-0.06,0.17) n (-0.02,0.11) n 
Both Moving Band ER (-0.07,0.17) n (-0.11,0.22) n (-0.07,0.14) n 
Debt Crisis 3yr Window (-0.27,0.04) n (-0.27,0) y (-0.08,0.04) n 
Banking Crisis 3yr 
Window 
(-0.52,-0.3) y (-0.21,-0.01) y (0.02,0.1) y 
Currency Crisis 3yr 
Window 
(-0.44,-0.23) y (-0.28,-0.06) y (-0.06,0.03) n 
Exporter Fes Yes Yes Yes 
Importer Fes Yes No Yes 
Year Fes No Yes Yes 
Dependent variable is real bilateral trade flows. The doubtful set of parameters is every parameter listed, except for 
log of distance and product of two countries GDP.  LB refers to highest value of the parameter in all of the models 
estimated, UB refers to the highest value of the parameter estimated. Leamer considers an estimate “robust” if its 
highest and lowest estimated value does not include zero.         
 
 
